The representation of white working class women in the construction of a reactionary Populist movement: 'Purified' Afrikaner Nationalist agitation for legislation against 'mixed' marriages 1934-1939 by Hyslop, Jonathan
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
Afr ican S t u d i e s S e a i n a r Paper
t o be p r e s e n t e d i n RW 7003 SEMINAR ROOM
AT 4.00pm 2 4 t h May 1993
Title: The Representation of White Working Class Woien in the
Construction of a Reactionary Populist Movement: 'Purified f
Afrikaner Nationalist Agitation for Legislation against 'Mixed*
Marriages 1934-1939.
by: Jonathan Hyslop
No 340
The Representation of White Working Class Women in the
Construction of a Reactionary Populist Movement: 'Purified'
Afrikaner Nationalist Agitation for Legislation against 'Mixed'
Marriages, 1934-1939.
Jonathan Hyslop
In May 1938, the largely white South African electorate went to
the polls. But the question which had preoccupied participants
in the preceding weeks of the election was not, as one might
imagine, the segregationist policies of General Hertzog's
government or the economy's gradual emergence from the depths of
the Great Depression. Rather, debate and agitation focused on an
image of white womanhood. That image was contained in a poster
distributed by the * Purified' National Party (Gesuiwerde
Nasionale Party) (GNP) of Daniel Francois MaIan, and was a
pictorial representation of the GNP's contention that Hertzog,
through his ^Fusion' alliance with pro-British forces of General
Jan Smuts to form the United Party (UP), had sold out Afrikaner
political interests, in particular by adopting insufficiently
aggressive racial policies.
In the poster (Burger, 8.5.38.), a young woman is placed at the
centre of a text: "The Hope of South Africa speaks to You and
says Wote for the National Party and Protect my People (Yolk)
and my Posterity (Nageslag)'...". The invocation of posterity
signifies the GNP's view of women as the continuators of racial
* purity'. For in the lower part of the poster, the * dangers'
against which she has to be ^protected' are identified. In a
sketch on the left-hand side of the poster, a young white woman,
wearing a simple cotton dress characteristic of working class
Afrikaner women of the period, is shown sitting outside a slum
house (cf. the photographs in Brink 1986:vi,xxi-xxv). Two
neglected-looking children, one black and one white, are playing
in the door-way. Slouching against the wall is a black man
wearing a tuxedo. He is smoking a cigarette through a long
cigarette holder. The intended import of this somewhat baffling
image is conveyed through the words below it. The *Hope of South
Africa' is to be protected against "Mixed Marriages which the
United Government Will Not Prohibit By Law". The message was
that the unwillingness of the UP to legislate against *mixed'
marriages was allowing feckless black males to marry and exploit
white women.
The other dangers against which the GNP proposed to defend
Afrikanerdom are portrayed in the lower right hand portion of the
poster. Four men stand arm-in-arm, clad in suits of varying
degrees of elegance. They are identified by labels on their
trouser legs: "Capitalist, Communist, Imperialist, Jew". The
caption tells the reader that they represent the peril of "Fusion
with Foreign Elements : The Price of the United Party's Creed of
Love and Peace". In this Hitlerian paranoid fantasy, the
Afrikaner volk is warned of an unholy alliance against it of
external forces. As in Nazi propaganda, the anti-semitic element
is a crucial one, for it provides GNP leaders with a basis for
the inherently implausible idea of a Capitalist-Communist
alliance, by suggesting that both groups are arms of a Jewish
Conspiracy. The term * fusion' (samesmelting) is a play on the
name given to the Hertzog-Smuts alliance; it is not merely a
fusion between two political parties, but a fusion of renegade
Afrikaners with the enemies of the volk.
It was not the anti-semitism of the third picture, but rather the
portrayal of mixed marriages in the second that became the
central issue of the election campaign. The contest became one
waged between the GNP and the UP on the terrain of which party
was most opposed to mixed marriage, and which policy was best
equipped to prevent it. The GNP claimed that only legislation
against %mixed' marriages could ensure the maintenance of
* racial' boundaries. The UP on the other hand made great
political capital of the idea that the National Party had
insulted white women by the mere suggestion that they would marry
black men. Their campaign was based on the assertion that white
women did not need legislation to protect them against the wiles
of black seducers. As the campaign boiled over with racist
invective, the male politicians of each side competed as the
champions of white women against the supposed black threat. This
incident consolidated white political opinion against mixed
marriages. It was no accident that the very first significant
piece of apartheid legislation enhanced by the Malan Nationalist
Party on coming to power in 1948 was an act of the subsequent
year prohibiting *mixed' marriages.
Faced with such evidence of the racial obsession of white South
African politics in the pre-apartheid era, it is extremely
tempting to come to the same conclusions as South Africa's most
outstanding literary figure, J.M. Coetzee. In a recent article
Cortzee (1991) examines the thought of the Afrikaner nationalist
ideologist, Geoff Cronje, who played a prominent role in
articulating Malanite racial doctrine on sex, marriage and
'miscegenation' in the years leading up to the NP's 1948 election
victory. Coetzee portrays the rise of apartheid as a phenomenon
of collective insanity. For Coetzee, the contemporary historians
of apartheid fail because they does not recognise that apartheid
is a form of collective madness. The white electorate of the
1940's was "for a time crazy or at least crazed" (30). Coetzee
argues that historians, by seeking to show the * deeper' interests
such as those of ethnic mobilization or class lie beneath the
overt ideology of apartheid, fail to deal with the irrational in
politics. He goes further, to attack the very idea of trying to
explain the origins of this collective racial madness; all that
is possible is a "tracking, a following in the footsteps of the
movement in which ideas are displaced - reading, that is to say,
rather than explanations" (27). Coetzee finds the work of
contemporary historians deficient in that it tends to posit a
notion of a "thinking, devising subject animated by self-
interest". Leaders are, he charges, seen as consciously writing
ideologies in order to manipulate supporters, while the ordinary
person becomes "the object on whom this text is written" (27) .
Coetzee suggests that instead leaders were just as caught up in
the racial madness of apartheid: "Legislators no less than the
electorate were caught in the phantasmic transaction" (28). He
questions whether there was anyone involved "who was neither
deceived nor self-deceived nor crazy ..." (30).
Coetzee undoubtedly identifies a significant limitation of the
work of contemporary South African historians. There is
certainly a tendency to move too rapidly from economic and
political interests to the identification of cultural phenomenon
as their direct expression. The psychological level of
connection between structural realities and perception in South
Africa would repay closer scrutiny. But Coetzee's article commits
the classic error of psycho-history, conflating a useful study
of the inner world of an individual with the related but
different question of how we are to explain collective behaviour.
As T.G. Ashplant (1988) points out in a survey of the field,
successful examples of psycho-history include a careful
delineation of the groups involved and their interaction and an
awareness of the complex sets of mediations between the level of
the unconscious and the level of public action. This
understanding of social groups and mediations is precisely what
is lacking in Coetzee's article; he moves directly from Geoff
Cronje's unconscious to 'the mind of Apartheid'. Moreover, even
when we move into the realm of the irrational, this does not as
Coetzee implies, exhaust the possibilities of explanation.
Coetzee gives a classically Freudian account of the obsessive
neurosis underlying racism (18-19). What is Freud's thought if
not a rational attempt to explain the irrational? To enter into
psychoanalytic discussion is not to abandon the usefulness of
explanation. There are ways in which psycho-history can usefully
take us beyond the postmodern fascination with %surfaces'.
More importantly from the perspective of this paper, Coetzee
abandons the terrain of social explanation with altogether too
much eagerness: we cannot explain everything about apartheid at
but we can explain much more than Coetzee allows, especially
through investigating the issues of gender. A central problem
is that, like many of the historians he criticizes, Coetzee fails
to develop an analysis of gender relations in the rise of
Afrikaner nationalism. Explanation is indeed insufficient if it
confines itself to explaining how Afrikaner nationalism organised
the consolidation of the leadership of emergent bourgeois over
subordinate classes and of white over black. For central to the
dynamics of this social and political movement was the
organisation of a new form of the domination of Afrikaner men
over Afrikaner women. A great deal of what appears as
* irrational' in the behaviour of male Afrikaner political leaders
is in fact quite explicable if examined from the perspective of
gender relations. In this paper, I will argue that the social
and economic upheavals of the 1920s and 1930s gave rise to an
Afrikaner female proletariat whose new-found independence
threatened the patriarchal relations of white society.
Many jof the features of social relations in the period can be
understood as an attempt to exert male control over women in this
new period. And this is particularly the case is explaining the
interaction of race and gender- The Nationalist's apparent
hysteria about "mixed marriages" in fact performed an important
role in re-establishing gender hierarchy. By portraying white
women as sexually threatened by black men, Afrikaner males
claimed the role of protectors of women, thereby reasserting
their patriarchal control. None of this is of course to suggest
that there is not a range of *deeper' psychological anxieties
amongst Afrikaner men which such claims led in to. But it is to
suggest that there was also a level of gender interests at play
which makes much political behaviour of the period explicable.
At a political level, Coetzee also plays down, quite excessively,
the element of conscious self-interest. As we shall see, the
Malanites made great capital, after they became the official
opposition in 1934, of the failure of the government to introduce
legislation against mixed marriages. Yet the Malanites had been
part of the governing party during the entire previous decade and
had never seriously attempted to bring about such legislation.
Are we then to conclude that the Purified Nationalists were
relatively sane before 1934, but suddenly became * crazy' on
splitting with Hertzog? A more plausible explanation is that the
GNP knew that agitation around *mixed marriages' could perform
certain important tasks for them. Firstly, the GNP was
attempting to mobilize *poor whites' behind them. In doing so
they faced a paradox. Their racial ideology proclaimed that
whites had an instinctive aversion to racial ^mixing' of any
kind. Yet at the same time, it was apparent that in the urban
slums whites were frequently not demonstrating this ^aversion',
socially or sexually. By thumping away at the *need' for mixed
marriage legislation, the Malanites were able to strengthen poor
white identification with a racially-defined identity, thus
facilitating their task of Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation.
Secondly, the GNP knew that the M.P.s on Hertzog's side of
parliament were divided for and against mixed marriage
legislation. The issue was that one on which the governing party
could potentially be split. The Malanites lost no opportunity
to foment these divisions.
At economic level too, Coetzee does under-rate the element of
conscious self-interest in the racial politics of the era. While
he is certainly correct that numerous historians have fallen into
a crude economism in viewing Afrikaner nationalism, the level of
expedient financial interest was far from absent. As we shall
see, the apparently irrational agitation for a mixed marriage act
was intimately linked with an agitation against the strong
position of the Indian community in the retail trade in the
Transvaal. Accusations that Indian shopkeepers were sexually
exploiting white female employees and forcing them into marriage
were used by Afrikaner nationalist agitators as part of a quite
conscious attempt to introduce discriminatory measures against
Indians which would open up economic space for Afrikaner
entrepreneurs.
Coetzee's inadequate recognition of these 'interest' dimensions
of apartheid is perhaps rooted in his particularly literary form
of inquiry. His article examines the racist texts produced by
Cronje as exemplifying the madness of apartheid. And indeed,
viewed on its own, the racist hysteria of these texts seems quite
inexplicable, and does probably tell more about the peculiarities
of Cronje's psyche than anything else. Yet to focus on these
books in themselves is misleading. It tends to give the
impression that the elaboration of racial ideology was a self-
sufficient process; and that the literary transmission of racial
ideas was crucial. But as Christopher Hill (1977:76-77) wisely
warns, "Historians, themselves the products of a literary
culture, relying so much on the written or printed evidence, are
always likely to under-estimate the verbal transmission of
ideas". The ideas expressed by Cronje's writings, which were not
published until the 1940s, had in fact emerged and crystallized
in the election meetings and political congresses of the 1930s.
They came not only from the brain of a demented ideologue, but
rather out of political battles in which political and economic
interests impinged on the apparently irrational to a greater
extent than Coetzee is willing to concede (Furlong 1991:225-230) .
A further difficulty with Coetzee's approach is the question of
how far his use of xmadness' as an account of apartheid is
supposed to extend. Is he claiming that it was a purely South
African phenomenon? In the world of the 1930s the international
hegemony of white racism was only slowly eroding. When the De
Villiers commission on mixed marriages reported in 1939, it
gleefully attached to its report an appendix of nine pages
dealing with restrictions on * miscegenation' in some 30 U.S.
states. In almost all the states involved the restrictions on
vmixed marriages' were more severe than those prevailing in South
Africa. (The legislation in the U.S. was in force in both
Southern and Western states, in the former case actuated by anti-
black racism and in the latter by anti-Asian racism) . Are we
then to conclude that the whole %white' world was mad until the
1940s? Possibly, but then such an argument cannot be based on
an argument concerning the exceptional mental state of
Afrikaners.
'Mixed' Marriage: The Background
The centrality which the mixed marriage issue assumed in 1930s
political discourse does seem very odd indeed if one considers
the tiny number of marriages which were considered as falling
into this category. The De Villiers commissions own statistics
for 1930-37 showed that the total number of marriages involving
one non-black partner fluctuated between a high of 101 in 1937
and a: low of 72 in 1934 (De Villiers 1939:26) . The vast majority
of these marriages were between white men and women regarded as
^coloured' (Hansard, 22.1.37:529). What is particularly
striking, given the hysteria that came to surround the marriage
of white women to ^ Indians' and ^ Africans', such marriages hardly
occurred during the period in question. The De Villiers
commission found nationally that there were three cases of
marriage between white women and African men in the period 1929-
1931, and that no examples of such marriages could be found in
the five years thereafter. As for marriages between whit^ e women
and Indian men, these ranged, in the 1930-7 period, between a
high of 8 in 1937 and a low of 1 in 1935 (De Villiers 1939:25).
Remarkably, before 1948, neither the Union of South Africa nor
any of its predecessor states had imposed legal sanctions against
mixed marriage. The pre-Boer War Transvaal republic (and thus,
subsequently, Transvaal province) had provided racially separate
legal structures for white and black marriages, making it
impossible for marriages which were viewed as inter-racial to be
solemnized in that part of the country. But the Transvaal did
recognise the validity of inter-racial marriages contracted in
the other three provinces which placed no legal obstruction on
them (Findlay 1936:5; Du Toit 1982:65).
The 1927/28 Immorality Act did reflect a rising official concern
with inter-racial sexual relationships, but it was not part of
the sort of frantic populist agitation that surrounded the *mixed
marriage' issue in the 1930s. This odious piece of legislation
essentially rationalised existing provincial measures preventing
African men from having sex with white women. These prohibitions
were contained in broader pieces of legislation aimed at
regulating prostitution (Du Toit, p.64). The Immorality Act
consolidated these existing regulations and introduced a new
provision making sex between white men and African women illegal.
The Act did not, however, outlaw sex between, whites, coloureds
and Indians (Du Toit 1982:65). Nor did it in any way affect the
legality of marriages between whites and Africans. There was a
sharp rise in marriages between whites and Africans in 1927 and
1928 as cohabiting couples sought to legalise their relationships
(De Villiers 1939:27).
American Comparisons
In order to understand the relationship between the anti-*mixed'
marriage agitation and Afrikaner Nationalist political
mobilization, it is useful to draw a comparison between
developments in the South Africa of the 1930s, and the Southern
U.S. in the era between, approximately, 1890 and the First World
War. It is well know that in the U.S., the turn of the century
brought with it an upsurge of racist political mobilization, a
dramatic rise in the number of incidents of lynching of blacks
by whites, and the advent of Jim Crow legislation, laws formally
segregating areas of Southern life where racial separation had
previously taken place by custom, and had been less systematic.
As C. Vann Woodward (1988) convincingly argues in a recent
defence of his classic work on Jim Crow (Woodward 1957) , this era
of more formal racial segregation was a phenomenon connected with
urbanization. In the rural past, paternalistic forms of racial
control had been exercised by white agriculturalist patriarchs
over rural blacks. Formal segregation was not a major part of
this social order, firstly because it would have cut across the
white paternalist's ideological claim to be a ^father' to his
black family, and secondly because it was simply impractical in
the close physical and social proximity in which black and white
lived in pre-industrial agricultural society. However, with the
rise of the *New South', industrialization and urbanization shook
both poor white and poor black loose from the land, and
increasingly threw them into contact in the new urban centres.
With the failure of the somewhat half-hearted attempts during the
1890s, of white populists to build solidarity between poor
farmers of both races, racist populism increasingly won support
amongst the white poor. Racist demagogues came to the fore, and
the white plantocracy more and more abandoned their paternalist
control of black voters, to embrace the segregationist cause and
the disenfranchisement of blacks.
However, feminist historians of the American South have recently
added a gender dimension to our understanding of this period,
which has important implications for our appreciation of the
significance of the *mixed marriage' issue in South Africa.
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall (1979: 129-157) has demonstrated that the
hysteria of Southern white males in defence of the venerable
institution of lynching was in fact bound up centrally with
defence of their power as men. The standard defence of lynching
offered by Southern men was that it was necessary in order to
protect Southern women against the threat of rape. In fact
studies of lynching have shown that it was only in a minority of
cases that the lynch victim was even accused of sexual offences.
But this did not mean that the *rape' issue was only an excuse
for racial repression. Certainly, lynching served to keep
Southern blacks in a state of terror. But the claim of white men
to be protectors of Southern * ladies' also reinforced their
claims to control of white women in a period of dramatic social
change.
This type of analysis has been developed further by Nancy MacLean
(1991) in her brilliant interpretation of the 1913-1915 Leo Frank
case, in which a Jewish factory manager in Atlanta, Georgia was
falsely accused of the murder of a teenage factory worker, Mary
Phagan. For Southern populists, Frank, as a northern Jew, became
a symbol of the social forces threatening to undermine the
Southern way of life, and especially its system of racial
domination. The case caused a huge outpouring of reactionary and
anti-semitic popular agitation, Frank was found guilty, but his
sentence was commuted by the state governor. A mob then broke
into the prison where Frank was being held and summarily lynched
him.
MacLean (1991:920) usefully designates the form of political
mobilization involved in the Atlanta case as "reactionary
populism" in which populist anti-elitism coexists with and gains
support for a political agenda aimed at maintaining particular
social hierarchies. Changing gender and generational relations,
MacLean argues, contributed to the appeal of this reactionary
populism, and so sexual conservatism should be seen, in
interaction with class grievances and racial antipathies, as one
of its defining elements. In the process of industrialization,
as young white women were drawn into industrial labour in the
cities, their new-found independence challenged the 4 o m e s ti c
authority of their parents, "a daughter going out to work had
opportunities to assert her autonomy and to make choices about
her relations with men that would have been hard for her
grandmother to imagine" (HacLean 1991:955). The fact that the
working woman was now outside the home was a standing threat to
the generational authority of parents and the patriarchal
authority of fathers and husbands. The power of reactionary
populism was that it tapped the emotional fears of Southern males
about their declining authority over women and linked these
anxieties to their concern about the threat to racial control
over blacks posed by urbanization. The racist political
mobilization of the period was so appealing to Southern white men
because their claim to *protect' Southern white women against
blacks shored up their position in the hierarchy of gender just
as centrally as it did their position in the hierarchy of race.
(For a fascinating and unexpected South African connection with
the Frank affair see Couzens (1992:361-410)).
The implications of Hall and MacLean's work for the South African
case are fascinating. Just as in the America of the turn of the
century, the 1920s and 1930s in South Africa saw large numbers
of young white women drawn into industrial labour. As in the
South, this occurred at a period in which urbanization and
industrialization were eroding the paternalistic forms of racial
domination which had earlier been predominant in an
agriculturally-based social order. For Afrikaner Nationalist
leaders, the advocacy of the need to outlaw mixed marriages
fulfilled a similar purpose to that which the rape scares and
panics over the position of white factory girls fulfilled for
right-wing Southern demagogues. In both cases the psychological
threat experience by white men to their authority within their
homes was linked to a campaign for racial control, giving the
latter an added psychological charge. But the response of white
men to these campaigns were not, as Coetzee's analysis would
suggest, solely a manifestations of the irrational. White men
had very definite interests in maintaining their social,
political and economic control over white women.
The Proletarianization of Afrikaner Women
During the 1920s and 1930s, the declining hold of poorer
Afrikaner farmers, small holders and tenants on the land, created
a strong trend toward urbani zation. In this period secondary
industry was growing in South Africa, and this offered the
possibility of employment for young Afrikaners moving off the
land. The food, textile, printing and chemical industries,
especially on the Rand, offered employment to those leaving
impoverished and drought stricken rural areas. But this process
had a particular gender and racial dynamic. In 1924 48% of the
manufacturing workforce in Johannesburg were white women, and
this figure had risen by 1935 to an astonishing 73% (Parnell,
1988a, 1988b, 1993).
Why did white female labour become so predominant in
manufacturing? Beyond the obvious point that gender relations
permitted women to be employed at lower pay rates than men, an
important aspect was that rural Afrikaner women were often going
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to the cities and engaging in wage labour a whole generation
before the male members of their families (Van Niekerk 1988:58).
While Afrikaner women typically left school at 16 or younger,
their average age of marriage was around 25 (Van Niekerk 1988:68-
70) • At the same time, the growth of a market economy meant that
household goods which had previously been produced by rural
women, such as candle, clothes soap and food were increasingly
bought in stores. Given that young women were thus available to
work and their economic role in the household was becoming less
central, it was increasingly an attractive option for
impoverished rural Afrikaner parents to encourage their daughters
to take waged work in order to supplement the family income (Van
Niekerk 1988:^7). A contributing cultural element in Afrikaner
women's search for waged work was that Afrikaner marriage
practices were organised around the dowry: any contribution which
young women could make toward the family finances could also help
to make them more marriageable (Van Niekerk 1988:67) .
Ideological factors also contributed to employers preferences for
female labour: The industries which employed women often saw
them as ^suitable' for factory work (Walker 1979:56), praising
their ^ inborn' ability and ^ nimble fingers' (Brink 1986:64). The
question of why employers opted for white rather than black
female labour is a complex one. One important explanation is
that during most of the 1920s and 1930s, the inland industrial
cities were largely white cities. In 1921 there were 153,000
whites in Johannesburg and 136,000 blacks and even by 1936 the
number of blacks in the city was only marginally greater than
that of whites (Brink 1986:191). But the consequence of an
economic system based on the migrant labour of black men, was
that the numbers of white women in the cities far exceeded the
number of black women. While black men poured into the cities,
the migrant labour system meant that the women and children in
their families often remained in the rural areas. In 1928, there
were 112,000 white women on the Rand, but only 29,000 African
women (Brink 1986:191). Although the proportion of African women
in urban areas increased sharply between the wars, they still
remained much fewer than white women; in 1936, there were
196,000 white women on the Rand as against 107,000 African women
(Brink 1986:191). While in coastal cities, especially Cape Town,
employers in manufacturing made use of the labour of * coloured'
(supposedly *mixed' race) women, the employment of women from
this community was a limited possibility on the Rand, because of
its small size (there were only 15,000 women designated as
coloured on the Rand in 1936) (Brink 1986:59,191). An added
attraction for manufacturers of using white labour was that in
the 1920s and 1930s, government contracts were preferentially
awarded to factories employing white labour (Brink 1986:63-64).
A situation where young women were playing a growing economic
role outside the home was inherently threatening to the kind of
patriarchal authority which Afrikaner men had previously
exercised. But the strains involved in this process were
undoubtedly magnified by the particular economic impact of the
Great Depression on gender patterns of employment. As the
depression devastated the economy, urban white male unemployment
soared as Afrikaner families were forced off the land, and the
mines carried out retrenchment. In Johannesburg, the numbers of
white males unemployed rose from 17,000 in 1926 to 72,000 in 1933
(Brink 1986:45). But at the same time, the urban industries
which employed women workers expanded their operations, even in
the worst periods of economic diaster. While male employment in
industry declined between 1927/8 and 1932/33, the number of women
employees rose from 12,000 to 17,000 (Brink 1986:56). For
example in the Germiston industrial area, Germiston, employment
of white women grew from 429 in 1930 to 843 in 1933, while
employment of black and male labour was fairly stagnant (Brink,
1986:191). This situation rapidly changed social relations
inside Afrikaner families. The 1932 report of the Department of
Labour noted that male unemployment was encouraging women "to
remain in or return to the factory after marriage and in a large
percentage of industrial families the women are the principal
wage earners" (Brink 1986:56). Amongst women garment workers on
the Rand it was common to find that they were supporting husbands
or fathers who could not find work or were disabled through
illness (Brink 1986:79-82,91-5).
This created an economic situation which cut across earlier
patterns of gender relations. Afrikaner working women on the
Rand were predominantly from the countryside and small towns of
the Transvaal, where family relations were of a highly
patriarchal kind. Yet in the city of the 193 0s, they were
predominantly involved in economic activity outside the home.
(Brink 1986:16-17,25).
A crucial part of the argument of this paper is that this
situation represented a crisis in gender relations. Daughters
who had left their families in rural areas were not only free of
parental control but were also playing a major role in supporting
their families. Women who were part of urban households were
increasingly taking the role of breadwinner. This generated
challenges by young women to the authority of fathers and
husbands. Brink shows that parents felt increasingly defied by
their daughters. Anxiety over the sexual conduct of young women
was widespread in families. Reluctance to allow young women to
the city was only overcome by economic necessity (Brink
1986:147-151; Van Niekerk 1988:73). Domestic violence emerged
as a major problem as existing patterns of gender relations
crumbled (Brink 1986:84-5). It was this crisis in gender
relations within the Afrikaner family which fuelled the appeal
to racist sentiment of the Malan Nationalists in the *mixed
marriage' campaign. And to add to the crisis. South Africa had
only just incorporated white women into the polity. In 1930 it
extended the vote to women (Walker 1979:84). This implied that
the various political formations would have to find ways to
incorporate women into their political discourses.
By the 1930s, the perception that white working class women were
socially and sexually out of control was widely being expressed
by the middle classes. Elsabe Brink has shown that although
Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail gave positive coverage to a 1928
strike by women garment workers, the strikes of 1931 and 1932
were met with extreme hostility by respectable opinion; the
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strikers were commonly characterized as "factory girls" who
"slept with the police" and who did not "know how to behave
decently" (Brink 1986:165-167). Within the factories. Brink
(1986:162) points out, "in a relationship with men not controlled
or overseen by kin or family relations, these women were regarded
as being unprotected and not quite respectable". In the mind of
male officialdom, white women factory workers were viewed as
indistinguishable from prostitutes. Following a tour of
inspection of local (multi-racial) brothels in November 1938,
Johannesburg's mayor, J.J. Page, commented that "one of the main
causes for the state of affairs was the poor wages of the factory
girl. We must raise her wages to the level where she will be
able to afford harmless pleasures" (Freed 1949:102-4).
Notions of female sexual degradation were closely tied to the
major housing problems affecting the white working class in South
African cities from the interwar years. As Susan Parnell (1988a,
1988b, 1993) has shown, by the 1930s, a deep housing crisis had
emerged amongst the white working class. In Johannesburg and
other industrial areas, white working class people lived in grim
slum yards and crowded boarding houses. What was of particular
concern to middle class opinion in this situation was that the
housing in many of these slum areas was not racially segregated.
Housing reform thus became a widely supported objective in white
politics. It centred on the idea of saving the white working
class from the twin perils of racial mixing and disintegration
of traditional family structures. They were to be
* rehabilitated' into the racial boundaries and forms of family
life which the middle classes held dear. During the 1930s,
public housing schemes were initiated which sought not only to
rescue the white working class from poverty, but also to place
them in a racially segregated environment. An important
limitation of these schemes, was, however, that the new houses
were family accommodation only. The large number of single women
factory workers who had no relatives in the towns were thus no
better off for the existence of new public housing. Their
situation was, however taken up by Afrikaner cultural
organisations, especially the Dutch Reformed Church and the
Women's Federation, which set about constructing single women's
hostels. These hostels were conceived by those that ran them as
providing simultaneously for the moral regulation of women's
sexual behaviour and their inculcation with * correct' white
racial and Afrikaner ethnic identification. Reporting to the
annual conference of the Women's Federation, the committee of the
Harmonie Hostel warned that bad housing could lead young women
"to become spiritually lost in the city and become a burden and
curse to the volk instead of a blessing"; while failure by
Afrikaner organisations to help them could lead to their "being
lost to the volk and the church" (Brink 1986:155) . As George L.
Mosse (1985:32) puts it for the case of 19th and early 20th
century Europe, "the guardians of morality felt threatened by
the city,' the apparent center of an artificial and restless age",
which they saw as a site of deracination, alienation and
"unbridled sexual passion".
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Malan : xSavina' White Women for Afrikanerdom
The emergence of the GNP in the 1930s can be understood as
analogous to the reactionary populism of the turn of the century
American South. The Hertzogites, like the restored plantocracy
of the post-Reconstruction South, were content to exercise the
sway of a comfortable, rurally based elite over a largely
deferential white electorate. Like the Radical racist leaders
of the Jim Crow period, the Malanites mounted a reactionary
populist challenge to this elite, mobilizing the white poor in
a new and activist style of politics, in order to impose a more
systematic form of racial domination. In this task, the threats
experienced by Afrikaner men to their patriarchal authority were
grist to the political mill of the South African racial
populists, just as they had been for their American counterparts.
Reading Woodward's (1963) magnificent biography of the Georgia
populist, Tom Watson, one feels that D.F. Malan and his familiars
would have been very much at home with Watson's cynical
exploitation of sexual anxieties to achieve strong racial
mobilization.
Afrikaner nationalism is often seen as shifting to racial
populist agitation with the 1929 general election in which
Hertzog's followers focused on the alleged dangers to white
control posed by Smuts policies (e.g. Dubouw 1989:16-17). But
this view involves a significant blurring of the distinction
between Malan and Hertzog's styles of politics. It is perfectly
true that Hertzog's platform performances involved a big dose of
knockabout racism (Star, 15.5.29). However, his attack on Smuts
in 1929 was primarily aimed at Smuts' advocacy of closer
political links between South Africa and British colonial Africa.
The Hertzogite view was that this would lead to whites becoming
a tiny minority within a vast Pan-African state and that this
would compromise their position (Kruger 1961:148-149) There was
no real fear on Hertzog's part of the South African state not
being able to retain racial control. But Hertzog pursued an
elitist electoral style. Having whipped up the electorate's
racist sentiments, he was quite content to take their votes and
then let them go back to daily life. Hertzog's approach to
segregation in urban life was far less interventionist than that
of the GNP: as Du Toit (1982:61) points out, segregation as
practised in South Africa in the Hertzog era "was very much the
prevailing norm, but it was maintained largely by custom and
tradition".
The rise of Malan nationalism from 1934 represents a populist
departure from the relatively elitist style of Hertzog. Malan
could only succeed in taking power by organising a revolt by the
Afrikaner masses against the leadership of rich farmers and
notables typified by Hertzog. In order to do this he had to
mobilize the burgeoning Afrikaner working class and urban petty-
bourgeoisie. But this aim presented several problems. Afrikaans
speaking poor whites in the urban areas would by no means
automatically identify as Afrikaners. There were several
competitors, besides the UP, for working class support. The
Labour Party, although white supremacist, organised white workers
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around a distinctively class orientated and non-Afrikaner
identity. As O'Meara (1983:78-95) has argued, the Labourites'
hold over white unions and white working class electoral politics
on the Rand was a serious obstacle to the GNP, and was only
eventually broken in the 1940s. The Garment Workers Union (GWU)
organised white working class women in a way which, as Brink
(1986:145) has demonstrated, enabled them to develop a collective
identity based on dignity, and self-respect. The GWU developed
during the 193 0s as an organisation with a predominantly female
leadership (Brink 1986:124-5). The union thus offered a very
different form of identity to Afrikaner working women than did
the GNP. It was by no means given that white women workers would
automatically align with Afrikaner nationalism. There was
widespread concern in Afrikaner leadership circles over the lack
of such identification: an editorial in Die Vaderland (17.11.36,
cited in Brink 1986:156) opined that the white workers were
"surrounded by factors which can estrange them and let them come
loose from the ethnic group from which they stem".
Malanite rhetoric after 1934 often appears self-contradictory
because of the way in which it veers between assertions of the
need to prevent the white working class from engaging in sexual
activity with blacks and on the other hand, its assertion that
whites had a natural or instinctual aversion to racial *mixing'.
But in terms of the political tasks that Malan was pursuing, this
apparently incoherent ideology made perfect sense. On the one
hand the reality was that many whites in urban areas were often
living in mixed slums, where racial boundaries were not very
rigid (Parnell 1988a:586; 1988b:115). On the other, the slum
dwellers of these areas would only rally to the Nationalists if
they could be mobilized on a racial basis. And the more that
racial sentiment could be presented to them as both natural and
as involving potential social advantages, the more support Malan
could rally.
Malan was highly aware that white working class allegiance to an
Afrikaner nationalism had to be created, rather than assumed to
exist. Addressing a 1934 congress on the poor whites he
expressed the fear that the spiritual isolation of the poor white
lay in being "no more a member of the volk. and the volk is no
longer part of them". The poor white had to be regarded as "a
human being and a racial comrade (volksqenoot)". [He] had to be
brought "once again to the stream of our volk life from which he
had been lost" (Burger, 5.10.34, cited by Scholtz 1984:23). The
Malanite leaders took great pains to impress on their audiences
that the decline of rectitude in female behaviour was linked to
a dwindling race-consciousness on the part of the white working
class. In an attack on the GWU, P.J. Kock, leader of the pro-
GNP rail union, Spoorbond, talked of how the GWU's activities led
to a situation when "daughters of the Free State went to
Johannesburg to dance with kaffers" (Brink 1986:186). The
Nationalists were also keen to link the question of mixed
marriages to the inadequate provision for white working class
housing and the *need' for residential segregation. The GNP's
Transvaal leader, J.G. Strydom told the party's 1936 provincial
congress that "The National Party had the task of keeping the
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white race white. It demands that a stop should be put to mixed
marriages and that the races must live separately ..." (Nasionale
Party, 1936).
The party also showed an awareness that if it was to appeal
successfully to women workers, it would have to take very
specific measures. In 1937, the GNP Transvaal leadership decided
that, all urban areas were to elect two women delegates to the
executive (Furlong 1991:102). The new female electorate was also
blandished with an increasing share of political symbolism.
References to Voortrekker women were very prominent in the
Malanite dominated Voortrekker centenary in 1938: One of the
wagons in the commemoration trek was christened "Wife and Mother"
(Brink, 1990:284). The Malanites pursued their propaganda on
mixed marriages through a wide range of cultural organisations,
especially those relating to women and youth. (De Villiers
Commission 1936:17-18; Vaderland, 21.6.35; Burger, 28.6.37;
Furlong 1991:107-108).
Anti-Indian Agitation and Mixed Marriages
Contrary to the implications of Coetzee's article, economic
interests of the crassest sort do help us to understand a major
strand of the mixed marriage agitation. But at the same time,
the absence of an adequate account of gender relations in his
article deprives us of another means of investigating the
phenomenon. A major strand in the Malanite's support for mixed
marriage legislation was their attack on the Indian shop keepers
of the Transvaal, who were collectively accused of seducing
Afrikaner women. A standard narrative was evolved and propagated
by Malanite politicians which held that Indian shopkeepers were
hiring Afrikaner women as shop assistants, then seducing them
with the intention of trapping them into marriage, and thus
gaining ownership of the women's property. This discourse was
useful to the Nationalists in two respects. Firstly it
channelled Afrikaner resentment of the success of Indian
shopkeepers into support for the drive of aspirant Afrikaner
capitalists to displace the Indians in the retail sector.
Secondly, it picked up the resentment of Afrikaner men that some
of * their' women were working in Indian-owned businesses in a way
which threatened racial hierarchy. It linked this resentment to
a fear of the loss of control over women. This provided an
important way of winning backing for Malanite organisations and
votes for the GNP.
The commercial success of the descendants of late nineteenth
century Gujerati immigrants was a very clear feature of Transvaal
life by the 1930s. According to Swan(1987:190) , between 1932 and
1946 millions of pounds worth of property was bought by Indians
in the Transvaal. An insight into white rural perceptions of
these developments is provided by a 1937 report from J. Vlok, the
Magistrate of Bethal, Transvaal, to the Secretary for Justice.
Vlok waxed wrathful; "the position of the increasing influence
of the Asian in the smaller towns of the countryside is more or
less the same everywhere" (Vlok, 1937) . Why this success was so
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resented is suggested by Vlok's comments on the relationships
between Afrikaner debtors and their Asian creditors in small
Transvaal towns. He claimed that in the area of Leslie, "a large
percentage of the farmers" were "deeply in debt" to the Asians.
There were cases of farmers whose "economic position was regarded
as strong" who were as much as 700 pounds in debt to Asian firms
(Vlok, 1937). What was, of course, so irksome to rural whites
was that the disjunction between political power and economic
power represented by the fact that enfranchised whites were in
debt to politically rightless Indians, threatened the racial
hierarchy. Vlok saw this in a particularly paranoid way; for
him the Indian businessman was giving credit to whites "to obtain
influence thereby which he will use to his advantage in one or
another manner" (Vlok, 1937). Vlok connected such incidents to
the mixed marriages issue. Such incidents he opined, negatively
affected "the prestige of the European". To demonstrate his case
Vlok brought four instances of inter-racial relationships which
he clearly regarded as shocking. At Leslie, a white
schoolteacher had become * involved' with an Asian while working
in a store. At Vereniging, a Miss Denison, was employed as a
bookkeeper in an Indian firm, where she had developed a
relationship with a clerk (significantly) "without the knowledge
of her father". To Vlok's astonishment this had led to such
manifestations as Miss Denison taking evening trips to
Johannesburg in the clerk's Chrysler. Most dramatically of all,
one Ellen Orton had married an Indian trader to whom her father
was in debt (Vlok 1937).
The whole thesis of the disreputable intentions of Indian traders
toward white women's property was, of course, absurd. It was
hardly likely that women who owned large farms or numerous houses
would take jobs as clerks and bookkeepers. Ellen Orton's is the
only documented case of a white-Indian marriage which even
allegedly involved property considerations unearthed in the
Transvaal in the entire period, despite the best efforts of anti-
mixed marriage campaigners. (And even Vlok (1937) had to admit
that there was evidence conflicting with his belief that Ellen
had not wanted to marry her husband) . The number of white women
working for Asians was much smaller than the anti-mixed marriage
campaigners rhetoric suggested; a limited study conducted by
civil servants in 1937 could only find 62 such employees in the
Transvaal (Hofmeyr papers, Al lDg (file 1), "Europeans employed
by Asiatics 1937").
However, the theme of Indians' alleged seduction of white women
was a potential vote winner for the Malanites in the small rural
towns. The major role in propagating the myth of Indian
shopkeepers designs on white women and their property was played
by the Reddingsbond or Reddingsdaadbond (League of Salvation).
This Malanite organisation aimed to mobilise the savings and
political pressure of the Afrikaner poor in support of the
objective of developing an Afrikaner small business sector. The
most prominent representative of the Reddingsbond was its
president, C.K. Smit. During late 1934 and 1935 Smit stumped the
northern countryside holding a series of public meetings in
support of his agitation against the Indian traders (Vaderland,
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6.11.34; Natal Mercury, 11.6.35., 26.7-35). Smit was brutally
frank about the economic benefits which he foresaw in displacing
Indians from their economic position. He told an audience in
Bethlehem, Free State in June 1935 that if the Indians were
"forced out of shopkeeping there would be employment for not less
than 12 000 more white people in European shops" (Natal Mercury,
11.6.35). To his rural audiences Smit painted a dire picture of
Indian intentions: "He declared that many Indians employed white
girls and gave credit to their families to such an extent that
at length in some cases the parents agreed to the girls becoming
the Indian's wives" (Natal Mercury, 11th June, 1935).
Alternatively the women employees "became demoralized and in many
cases married Asiatics" (Natal Mercury, 26.6.35). He backed
these claims with lists of unsubstantiated tales about
relationships between white women and Indian men (Vaderland,
30.10.34). On the podium Smit demonised the Indian shopkeepers
to great effect, portraying the most innocent features of daily
life in threatening terms. Even politeness on the part of
shopkeepers was suspect; he warned an audience near Lichtenberg
against the "smooth civility" shown to white customers in Indian
shops. "They get what they require out of you, and when they
have sucked you dry, you are thrown aside", he continued (Natal
Mercury, 26,7.35). This implication talk of exploitative
relations, both economic and sexual, 1inked up to Smit's
portrayal of Indians as "dirty". "It was beyond his
comprehension how a European person with a different standard of
living could use food and sweets purchased from Asians" (Natal
Mercury, 26.7.35.). Speaking at a Pretoria conference Smit
pronounced that the "Indian question" was "more difficult and
dangerous" than "the native question". "The Indian" was, for
Smit, a deadly threat to Afrikaner business (die doodstuk van ons
handel) (Vaderland, 21.6.35).
The advantage of the anti-Indian agitation from the point of view
of the Malanites was that it interwove with rising anti-Indian
sentiment on a broader front, including amongst Herzog
supporters. A pro-Hertzog paper like xDie Vaderland'(3.9.35)
featured articles which, in alarmed tones, pointed out that the
clothing firm of Mothiar and Essa, in Pietersburg, white women
were working under Indian male instructors and alongside black
men. By late 1935 the largely United Party-supporting Municipal
Association of the Transvaal, was demanding residential and
business segregation of Asians (RDM, 16.9.35, 11.10.35). In
September 1935, a delegate at the OFS conference of the UP was
asking General Hertzog to "put an end to conditions which enabled
European girls to work for Asiatics". Hertzog managed the matter
with a typical piece of humbug, saying that "he felt deeply on
this tragic phenomenon in our social life" but that "there were
ramifications which placed it beyond the help of legislation"
(Hofmeyr Papers Al lDg Transcript of report from the friend,
12.9.35.). However, it was clear that the Malanites propaganda
was swaying his supporters and thus presenting him with serious
difficulties.
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The Parliamentary Politics of *Mixed' Marriage
At the level of parliamentary politics, the advantage of pursuing
the mixed marriage issue was clear for the Malan faction; it
would intensify conflicts within the government. General
Hertzog's primary concern, as leader of the UP, was to keep
together its more reactionary and more liberal factions. Whether
or not parliament legislated on the matter seems to have been a
matter of indifference to Hertzog. While he did not personally
favour legislation, his handling of the matter seems to have been
completely subordinated other considerations to maintaining party
unity (Paton 1964:259). This was a difficult feat. Powerful
figures on the extreme right of the party favoured legislation
against mixed marriages. The most notable of these were senior
UP members such as Oswald Pirow, and leading Transvaal M.P.'s
such as Jan Pienaar, and Piet Grobler. The most able of them,
Pirow, was a man whose talk was peppered with terms of racial
abuse (Paton 1964:167). The 1936 Transvaal conference of the
UP went so far as to pass a motion asking the government to
legislate against mixed marriages (Indian Opinion, 16.10.36.,
Hansard, 22.1.37.). On the other hand, the liberal group of UP
members around Jan Hofmeyr strenuously opposed such legislation.
This opposition was couched within a racist discourse - Hofmeyr
rejected what he called "the revolting possibility of ultimate
social equality and the mixture of the races (Paton 1964:242) -
as did his supporters in the liberal journal *The Forum' (Paton
1964:297). However, they favoured leaving the issue up to
personal choice. Relations between Hofmeyr and the rest of the
cabinet were strained, especially when, in 1936, Hofmeyr and a
group of Cape Town M.P.'s voted against legislation depriving
African male electors in the Cape of their votes (Paton
1964:231). Yet Hertzog was keen to maintain unity in the party
at all costs. While allowing UP members to pursue private bills
against mixed marriages, he made Hofmeyr Minister of the Interior
(and thus responsible for marriage legislation) in the very same
period (Paton 1964:259).
Malan and his supporters saw a great opportunity to convince
right-wing UP voters that Hertzog was betraying their
aspirations. Paton (1964:238-9,268) notes that the Malanites
delighted in the 1936 mixed marriage debate in parliament which
subjected the United Party to severe strain; Malan's intention
was primarily to use the issue to break the United Party. Far
from being driven by racial madness to pursue the issue, as
Coetzee's position would imply, Malan was rationally pursuing
political self-interest. Malan's practical cynicism on the issue
is suggested by the fact that his fervour for Mixed Marriage
legislation dated from 1934. For the previous eight years he had
served as Minister of the Interior, with marriage legislation
coming within his portfolio. Yet he made no effort to introduce
legislation on the mixed marriage question (Star, 5.5.38.) . His
interest in the matter increased in direct proportion to the
political benefits of exporting it.
From the background of agitation, an active parliamentary
politics developed around the *mixed marriages' issue. The rules
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of the game were clear. Rightist elements of a UP background
would introduce measures toward limiting mixed marriages, both
because of their own convictions, and the Nationalist-stimulated
demands of their constituents. The Nationalists would then weigh
in, seeking to maximise the division between the pro-legislation
and anti-legislation factions of the UP. Hertzog would
characteristically hedge his bets by allowing the pro-legislation
elements their head in the debate, while at the same time
placating the *liberals' by failing to put his personal weight
behind the proposed measures. Hertzog, by not committing
himself, effectively ensured the failure of the campaign.
The parliamentary debate on the marriage issue was an important
national sounding-board for the rhetoric of the mixed marriage
debate. M.P.'s sought to use this national stage to rally their
supporters around their particular perspective on racial matters.
There is no doubt that the overall effect was to strengthen the
racist consensus in white society. Through newspaper reports of
the debates, the arguments of the anti-mixed marriage and anti-
Indian campaigners were disseminated. And even the interventions
of those opposed to legislation also tended to use arguments
which strengthened racist sentiment.
The first parliamentary attempt to introduce a mixed marriages
act was a bill introduced by Major F.J. Roberts, the M.P. for
Vredorp, in March 1936 (Paton 1964:238). Roberts was an
eccentric ultra-rightist who had been expelled from the UP and
had recently been engaged in trying to set himself up as leader
of a fascist *A11 White League' based on the white unemployed
(Indian Opinion, 8.5.36). Sufficient time was not allocated for
the bill and it was talked out (De Villiers, 1939:15) Once it had
become apparent that the bill would not pass, J.H. Grobler, U.P.
members for Brits, proposed a select committee to enquire into
whether Asians were marrying and employing white women. Grobler
made it clear that he was particularly concerned about the extent
to which Asians were using marriage to whites to escape racial
restrictions on property ownership (Paton 1964:238; Hansard,
28.4.3.6:2629.) Grobler's speech in support of his bill was a
classic example of the central confusion built into mixed
marriage rhetoric. For Grobler "it goes without saying that no
white girl, especially girls who have grown up in South Africa,
would of their own motion agree to marry Indians ..•.", he argued
that it was only economic conditions that would force them to
work in Indian businesses. On the other hand, once a white girl
started working for an Indian, "it is obvious that the feeling
which exists against colour must necessarily diminish" (Hansard,
28.4.36:2634.) Like the Nationalist proponents of legislation,
Grobler was struggling to resolve the contradiction between a
belief in ^natural' racial aversion and the fact that the white
working class often failed to manifest it (Hansard,
28.4.36.:2637).
Hofmeyr, as Minister of the Interior rejected the call for
legislation, pointing out that only one incident had come to
light of an Asian in the Transvaal benefitting in terms of land
ownership, that a very small number of white women worked in
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Asian businesses, and that one of his inspectors had found the
working conditions in an Indian owned business in Springs better
than those in white businesses (Hansard, 28.4.36.: 2637-2640).
Roberts then introduced an amendment banning marriages between
*Europeans' and non-Europeans', citing messages of support from
branches of the Reddingsdaadbond, the Afrikaner Women's
Federation and other Malanite movements. He launched into a
oration about the dangerous political consequences of allowing
mixed marriages. If %coloureds' were allowed to marry whites
"why cannot they be the equals of Europeans in other respects?".
He agonized over the failure of the white masses to observe the
level of racial discrimination he considered appropriate,
deploring the fact that "we do not consider it a shame for a girl
to stand about the streets chatting to a coloured man or a young
man with a coloured girl" (Hansard, 28.4.36:2641-2644). The
debate continued with an orgy of anti-Indian and biological
racist rhetoric. The nadir of this came when two M.P. 's actually
endorsed the Naz i's recently imposed *Nuremburg Laws',
prohibiting sex and marriage between German Jews and their
compatriots (A.J. Swanepoel : [Hitler] wanted to keep the blood
of his nation pure, and can we blame him (?)"; M.J. van der
Berg: "...attempts are being made in Europe, especially in
central Europe, to build up a people that is 100 per cent pure.
That is being done in the interests of the health and prosperity
of the people ..." Hansard, 1.5.36:2865,2878.) In this Hitlerian
atmosphere biological metaphors of contagion flourished. Raising
the possibility that mixed marriages would encourage young women
in the countryside to get the impression that it was "was not
such a bad thing to marry a coloured man", E. de Souza, M.P. for
Lydenburg warned "we must kill the germ" (Hansard, 1.5.36:2870).
But while the UP and GNP backbenchers were parading their
knowledge of current biological racist texts, the astute Halanite
leadership were focusing on the potential political benefits of
the debate. J.G. Strydom, the emerging Halanite leader from the
Transvaal, drove home the divisive potential of the issue,
criticising Grobler for calling for a ban only on white-Asian
marriages instead of a total prohibition on marriages between
black and white (Hansard, 1.5.36:2870.). He honed in on the
divisions in the cabinet on the issue, citing a newspaper report
showing that Pirow favoured a prohibition on whites being
employed by Asians, but that his colleagues were split on the
issue (Hansard, 1.5.36:2870-1.) In the aftermath of the debate,
the Malanites Orange Free State luminary, C.R. Swart, crowed that
Hofmeyr had sealed his doom as an influence in the UP by refusing
to accept Grobler's motion and by his speech down-playing the
issue (Sunday Express, 31.5.36, cited by Paton 1964:239).
However, much Strydom and Swart may have shared the racial
delusions of the time, their political behaviour over the issue
is not evocative of ^madness' but rather of a quite %rational'
attempt to exploit divisions amongst their opponents. Despite
the failure of Grobler and Roberts' measures they were succeeding
in their intentions.
The subsequent year. General J.J. Pienaar, another rightist UP
member, introduced a bill to prohibit mixed marriages (Du Toit
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1982:67). Clearly a part of Pienaar's motivation was that his
party was facing the immediate prospect of three by-elections and
the longer term challenge of a general election, in circumstances
where the Malanites' mixed marriage agitation had found
considerable resonance amongst UP voters (Hansard, 22.1.37:552-
557; Paton 1964:259). Pienaar presented his case with a
considerable flavouring of homespun biological racism; in people
of *mixed' descent, he opined, "there is a constant strife
between the inherited colours which react in neutralising and
paralysing way" (Hansard, 22.6.3.7:523-4). All in all, however,
he clearly lacked the ideological fervour of the Malanites, for
he spent much of his speech reassuring ^liberals' of the
moderation of his bill, stressing that only marriage officers,
and not the couple involved, would be punishable; that all *the
races' opposed mixed marriages, that the bill merely completed
existing measures, and that it was only the "less qualified and
inferior" in each race who would want to engage in
'miscegenation' (Hansard, 22.1.37:522-524).
In response Hofmeyr hastened to re-assure the house of his
membership of the biological racist consensus: "I am strongly
against the principle of mixed marriages, probably as strongly
as any member. I deplore as much as anybody the consequences of
such unions, especially so far as the children are concerned"
(Hansard, 22.2.37.:527). However he claimed to be in possession
of a better means of preventing such marriages than legislation:
"there is a more effective way of dealing with a social evil of
this kind and that is by the application of a healthy and well
informed and rightly inspired public opinion" (Hansard,
22.1.37:529) .
This time the debate was even more divisive for the UP. When the
vote on adjournment of the Pienaar bill was taken, Pirow had
disappeared from the chamber so as to avoid the dilemma between
his desire to support the bill and his obligation to maintain
cabinet discipline. Many other UP M.P.'s had also gone missing.
As Hertzog came under increasing pressure from the Malanites to
commit himself to mixed marriage legislation, he had the debate
abandoned, so as to attempt to patch up the splits in his ranks.
At an emergency cabinet meeting Hertzog and Smuts tried to
conciliate both factions, supporting Hofmeyr's move for the
Pienaar/Grobler bills to be referred to a select committee, but
attempting to promise the Pirow faction that legislation would
be considered at the next session (Paton, 1964:259-261).
However, Hofmeyr threatened to resign if the government supported
mixed marriage legislation, and Pirow was forced to back down.
Once more, the Nationalists had exploited the mixed marriage
issue with success.
The 1938 Election
The discourse which parliamentary and extra-parliamentary
agitation had generated around the 'threat' of mixed marriages
became the focus of the 1938 general election. As in the U.S.
case, where in the 1890s and 1900s, the southern upper classes
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had embraced more intense racial language, in order to head off
the threat of the radical racists, so this election saw the UP
develop a new level of racial demagogy, in order to protect their
support from erosion by the GNP.
The controversial election poster was fully in line with the
logic of the racial populist agitation through which Malan aimed
to build support in the 1938 election. In the short
parliamentary session before the election, Malan indicated the
political direction he intended to pursue by proposing a package
of new discriminatory measures including racially segregated
housing and legislation prohibiting mixed marriages and
employment of whites by people of other races (Paton 1964:281).
In his electoral speeches, Malan plumbed the depths of racial
rhetoric. He told an audience at Stellenbosch that the
government, by refusing his segregationist measures, was
placating the liberals in its ranks and thus "sacrificing the
welfare of the country and the poor whites on the altar of party
politics". The second picture of the poster, depicting a Jewish
conspiracy, fitted in well with Malan's propaganda. He
polemicised at length against Jewish immigration, and suggested
that Jews were the controlling force behind the UP liberals. The
government was, he claimed, reluctance to legislate against
Jewish immigration because it was "afraid to lose the support of
organised Jewry, and afraid that the liberal and anti-liberal
elements in its ranks would come into conflict with each other"
(Star, 13.5.38).
The poster, which was widely distributed in the Southern
Transvaal (Star, 7.5.38) thus accurately reflected the thrust of
the Malan's campaign. It was in fact produced for the Malanites
by Voortrekker Pers, which also published the Malanite's new
Transvaal propaganda organ Die Transvaler (Star, 5.5.38; Furlong,
1991:38). This newspaper was at the time under the editorship of
Dr. Malan's able lieutenant and future ^genius' of the apartheid
system and prime minister, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd. Under Verwoerd's
energetic leadership, the paper threw itself into the campaign,
churning out propaganda. A typical Transvaler cartoon during the
election shows, under the heading %Ostrich Polities', a dam wall
cracking under the pressure of a murky black substance marked
*mixed marriages'. Below the dam wall an ostrich, marked United
Party, stands with its head in the sand. Hofmeyr and Pirow sit
on the river bed ignoring the impending flood, while a
nationalist cries out to them in alarm. The caption, personally
devised by Verwoerd himself, reads: "Worried Nationalist : Look
fellows - there are cracks in the dam wall. The Two "Friends":
Ag, what foolishness is this now?" (Transvaler, 10.5.38). In a
similar vein, as part of its campaign Die Transvaler (9.5.38.)
ran a photograph of "a certain Mr. Armstrong, a white, and his
lawful wife, a Baralong girl" triumphantly flourishing this as
evidence of the existence of mixed marriages in the Transvaal.
The Nationalist's campaign, however, met with only 1imited
success. For the UP showed themselves, at least in the short
term, quite as adept at manipulating the rhetoric of race and
gender. The UP's entire election campaign became focused on the
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issue of the poster- Their tactic was to charge that by
implying, through the poster, that white women would voluntarily
marry black men, the Nationalists had * slandered' white
womanhood. The UP press christened the poster Baster Plakaat
(Miscegenation Poster) , a term suggesting that the GNP were
somehow encouraging racial mixing. The Smutsite Johannesburg
Star (5.5.38) reproduced the poster, unctuously informing its
readers that "For obvious reasons. The Star publishes the poster
with considerable reluctance; but the libel on South Africans
irrespective of race, [i.e. English or Afrikaners] is so
monstrous that publication is probably the most effective means
of putting an end to this shameless propaganda ... " . The
Hertzogite Die Vaderland (12.5.38) joined in with, for example,
a cartoon showing Voortrekker women splattered with filth marked
1
 Dancing with Kaffers' and 'Baster Plakaat7.
The UP's campaign shrewdly drew in white women, but within the
framework of a discourse in which women portrayed themselves as
under the protection of their menfolk. Thus not only was the
women's vote mobilized, but the male electorate was reassured
that the UP's views did not threaten their patriarchal interests.
During the final weeks of the campaign UP speakers, especially
Pirow in the Transvaal and N.C. Havenga in the Free State,
addressed meeting after meeting whipping up the electorate over
the supposed xinsult to white womanhood' of the Baster Plakaat
(Star, 3-16.5.38; Vaderland, 9-11.5.38). The UP campaign was
especially aimed at fostering racist, but simultaneously anti-GNP
sentiment amongst white women. Havenga told a meeting at
Ladybrand that "He was certain that there were women and their
daughters among the Purified Party's ranks who would call to
account those guilty of such insults against Afrikaner women"
(Star, 4.5.38).
At most of their election meetings, the UP arranged for motions
to be passed against the poster, usually proposed by women. In
typical resolution, women voters at Ladybrand denounced the
Malanites: "For the past few years we have been made the victims
of the foulest allegations and insinuations. We have been
represented as persons who dance with natives, who require
legislation to keep our blood pure" (Star, 4.5.38). Another
such motion called on political leaders to attack the Malanites
"ghastly misrepresentations of the women and daughters of South
Africa" (Vaderland, 9.5.38). In a paroxysm of militancy, the
resolution continued "We do not doubt what their answer will be,
but if men are not ready for the bitterest struggle, the woman
of South Africa will raise her voice and hold high the torch, to
fight everything that is destructive of her honour and that of
her child" (Vaderland, 9.5.38). Two particular themes were
raised by the motions. One was that of the 'purity' of the
Voortrekker women's tradition. During 1938, the celebration of
the centenary of the Great Trek was taking place. Although in
general the Malanites were exploiting the political capital
involved in the festivities with great success, during the
election campaign, the UP were able to turn much of their
rhetoric back on them. At a meeting addressed by Pirow, a motion
was passed that "We the mothers, women and girls of Standerton,
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descendants of the most honoured of women - the Voortrekker women
- hereby declare our strongest protest and deep disgust of the
disgraceful way in which the Nationalist Party is conducting its
election campaign by the publication of revolting posters ..."
(Star, 11.5.38.) . The other line of attack on the Malanites made
in the meeting was that the poster would undermine racial power
structures by inciting black men to lust after white women. The
Standerton motion warned the poster would "cause natives and
coloured to lose their respect for our women-folk" (Star,
11.5.38.). Aletta Nel, mayor of Potchefstroom, warned of the
effect the poster would have on "the native mind", and claimed
that the poster had been hung up "on the walls of native homes"
(Star, 11.5.38), while at a UP meeting in Kinross, Mrs. J.E.C.
Oosthuizen asserted that the poster "has opened a new danger in
South Africa, giving the native the impression that his
attentions to European women would not be unwelcome" (Star,
7.5.38.).
Nationalist campaigners sought to defend the poster, commonly
attributing the agitation against it to Jewish interests
(although there was in fact very little public mention of the
poster's anti-semitic aspect) (Star, 9.5.38, 11.5.38). But the
UP's campaign found considerable resonance amongst the
electorate, and soon the GNP, at a local level, were in retreat.
In public meetings in the Transvaal, Malan supporters were not
opposing the motions against the poster (Vaderland, 9.5.38), and
in at least one case, in Krugersdorp, a woman Nationalist
supporter actually proposed the motion (Star, 11.5.38.). GNP
candidates in six Witwatersrand constituencies undertook not to
use the poster and publicly apologised for it (Vaderland,
9.5.38). Confronted by a women's delegation, *Kaalkop' van der
Merwe, the GNP candidate for Heilbron, repudiated the poster and
promised "to do everything in his power to prevent it being
distributed or seen by natives" (Vaderland, 9.5.38.) . The UP had
succeeded in demonstrating that their forms of racism were, for
the moment, as persuasive to the white electorate as those of the
GNP.
Aftermath of the Campaign
Yet the mixed marriage agitation had intensified the trend toward
Malanite reactionary mobilization which would culminate in the
forties. This was dramatically illustrated by an incident later
in 1938 in the western Transvaal town of Rustenburg. The Indian
community had, by and large, tried to avoid the intense political
pressure under which they were coming, by taking a conciliatory
political stance toward white rightists. The journal, Indian
Opinion (17.4.36), assured *Mr. Grobler and his friends' that the
community would not oppose legislation against mixed marriages.
When in 1939 Dr. Dadoo tried to organise the community against
the Asiatic (Transvaal) Land Tenure Act, which prohibited
transfer of land from whites to Indians, he had little support
from the Transvaal Indian Congress, because the traders
controlling it felt that the imposition of a degree of
segregation was outweighed by the fact that the Act gave them
23
greater security of tenure in their existing properties (Swan,
1987:200-201). But in the rural Transvaal this moderation in no
way deflected the wave of anger which the mixed marriage
agitation stoked up. During 1938, there were several incidents
of assaults on Indians, and stonings of Indian houses by white
youths in the western Transvaal town of Rustenburg (Star,
2.12.38;23.12.38.) Stories circulated in the town that Indian
shop owners were extending credit in their shops to the low paid
white female workforce of the local tobacco factory, and then
using this situation to exploit them sexually (Daily Express,
24.11.38; Vaderland, 26.11.38.).
On 19th November, following incidents in which white youths had
thrown stones at Indian houses, a brawl took place, in which the
white thugs seem to have come off worse (Star, 23,11.38, 1938;
5.12.38; Daily Express, 24.11.38.) This sparked a mass meeting
of a thousand whites in Rustenburg, at which a boycott of the
Indian shops was called (Star, 23.11.38.). The atmosphere of
pogrom grew so intense that four hundred Indians fled the town,
after having been advised to do so by the police (Vaderland,
26.11.38.) Following the incident 31 Indians were tried for
assault and 5 were found guilty of grievous bodily harm (Star,
5.12.38; Vaderland, 24.1.39.). Symbolically, the intensity of
white feeling around the issue was somewhat diffused by the
arrival in Rustenburg of wagons commemorating the Great Trek
(Transvaler, 1.12.38.). The energy whipped up by Malanite mixed
marriage agitation was channelled into a festival celebrating the
newly emergent Afrikaner populist identity.
The mixed marriage agitation was not an immediate success for the
Nationalists. In the 1938 election they did well only in the
Cape, and to a lesser extent in the Orange Free State. They
failed to break through in the white working class areas of the
Southern Transvaal which were to be so crucial to their electoral
triumph a decade later (Furlong 1991:100,117). Nevertheless, the
Nationalist's short term failure contained the seeds of long term
success. They had consolidated a strong core of supporters
around their reactionary populist programme. Their vote in the
election was 58% that of the UP (Furlong 1991:91,117). In May
1939 Malan was able to present to parliament a 230,000 signature
petition backing his package of racial measures (Du Toit
1982:77; Furlong 1991:99).
But a longer term victory for the Nationalists was to arise out
of their tactical defeat over the mixed marriages act. Hertzog,
seeking to avoid responsibility for this fraught issue, treated
it in the time honoured manner of South African leaders in
difficulties, by appointing a commission of inquiry to
investigate the question. He did this despite the fact that in
1937, the Wilcocks Commission on the Cape Coloureds had
specifically recommended against mixed marriage legislation (Du
Toit 1982:68-69). Given the atmosphere of hysteria that had been
whipped up over the issue during 1938, and the way in which the
UP had itself fermented sentiment against *mixed' marriages in
pursuit of its own electoral interests, the atmosphere
surrounding the commission was hardly conducive to a liberal
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outcome. The commission's report, published in 1939, came out
in favour of legislation against mixed marriages. In a document
structured around biological racist discourses, the commission
noted delightedly that black as well as white opinion was against
such marriages, welcomed the impact of segregated housing schemes
in reducing their incidence, and warned ominously of
"infiltration of coloured blood into the European group." Public
opinion was held not to be reliable as an obstacle to racial
mixing because it would not be universally adhered to, although
the committee seems to have preferred the expedient of preventing
mixed marriages being contracted to punishing those engaged in
such marriages (De Villiers 1939:32, Du Toit 1982:71-2). The
motivation for such legislation was spelt out with stunning
clarity: "the desire to keep the white population intact, as the
dominant and ruling race" (De Villiers 1939:30).
With the outbreak of World War II, the mixed marriage issue
temporarily receded from the political horizon. Hertzog, opposed
to participation in the war, split from the United Party, and Jan
Smuts took over as Prime Minister. As Hertzog's following tended
to be the more pro-mixed marriage legislation elements of the
U.P., the split reduced the pressure on the party to act on the
De Villiers commission's report and the document was left to
moulder. In any case politics became increasingly concerned with
Afrikaner nationalist opposition to Smuts' support of the British
war effort. But after the Malan Nationalists came to power in
1948, the De Villiers Report and the blatant racism of the UP's
1938 response to the mixed marriage issue came back to haunt the
party. In 1949 the Nationalists introduced legislation into
parliament banning mixed marriages. The United Party, having
helped generate a white consensus over mixed marriages, could
only argue rather weakly once again, that the best way to avert
such marriages was through public opinion. Piloting the bill
through parliament, the Nationalists' Eben Donges could smugly
point out that the legislation was based on the report of the UP-
appointed De Villiers commission. The bill was duly passed, and
South Africa had its first piece of apartheid legislation
(Furlong 1983:31-38; Du Toit 1982:73-4; Hansard, 19.5.49:6167-8).
Conclusion
This paper is, at a number of levels, a response to current post-
structuralist trends in historical work. In a certain sense it
is a positive response. The paper has attempted to treat the way
in which representations are constructed and disseminated as
central to the business of politics. However the paper also
represents an uneasiness with some of the more bizarre
consequences of post-structuralism, in this case represented by
Coetzee's, exploration of the rise of apartheid. Central to my
criticism of Coetzee has been his failure to locate the texts
which he studies in historical context. In this sense the
article provides backing for Bryan Palmer's (1990:5) rejection
of "all that is lost in the tendency to reify language, placing
it beyond social, economic and political relations...". Although
Coetzee talks a great deal about the need for ^reading', he
would in fact have provided a richer understanding of Crpnje and
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his ilk had he read more seriously what historians like O'Meara
(1983) or Giliomee (Adam and Giliomee 1979) have to say about the
background from which Cronje emerged. While there is indeed much
to criticize in the work he reviews, there is also much that
would have illuminated his study of apartheid origins, had he let
it. The paper has especially sought to show that Coetzee's
failure to explore adequately the historically rooted social
relations of gender weakens his analysis.
Secondly, the paper rejects Coetzee's repudiation of explanation.
The fact that a theory cannot explain everything in the world
does not mean that it cannot explain anything, or that
explanation is impossible. I have suggested in this paper that
Afrikaner nationalists bid for working class support, the
changing pattern of gender relations, the dynamics of
parliamentary politics, and the Afrikaner middle classes
aspirations to take the place of the Indians in the retail trade
explain a great deal about the actions of people whom Coetzee
describes as crazed.
Thirdly, the paper challenges the post-structuralist discounting
of any form of human agency. The trouble with an approach which
asserts that legislators were just as caught up in the madness
of apartheid as their followers, is that it means, in this case,
that one must ignore the extensive evidence of cynicism and
calculation on the part of both Malanite and Hertzogite leaders.
Such a position, as Cornel West (1989:225) points out in relation
to Foucault, "surreptitiously ascribes agency to discourse,
disciplines and techniques". By and large, the paper has
contended the discourse of mixed marriage was the tool of
politicians, rather than their master. Malan, the evidence
suggests, was precisely the kind of self-aware, manipulative
leader that Coetzee taxes historians with describing.
Curiously, it is post-structuralism's favourite philosopher who
puts my point best. "The priest rules through the invention of
sin" wrote Nietzsche (1974:166). Daniel Francois Malan,
ordained minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, played a large
part in the invention of the xsin' of *mixed marriage', and used
it as one of the methods through which he and his supporters
attained power.
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